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S u m m a r y
California has a complex, highly interconnected, and decentralized water system. Although local operations draw on considerable expertise and analysis, broad public policy and planning discussions about water often involve a variety of misperceptions—or myths—
about how the system works and the options available for improving its performance. 
The prevalence of myth and folklore makes for lively rhetoric but hinders the develop-
ment of effective policy and raises environmental and economic costs. Moving beyond myth 
toward a water policy based on facts and science is essential if California is to meet the multi-
ple, sometimes competing, goals for sustainable management in the 21st century: satisfying 
agricultural, environmental, and urban demands for water supply and quality and ensuring 
adequate protection from floods.
We focus on eight common water myths, involving water supply, ecosystems, and the 
legal and political aspects of governing California’s water system. These are not the only Cali-
fornia water myths, but they are ones we find to be particularly distracting and disruptive to 
public policy discussions. 
Often, myths serve the rhetorical purposes of particular stakeholders. And they persist 
because our public policy debates are not sufficiently grounded in solid technical and scien-
tific information about how we use and manage water. In combating these myths, we hope 
to set the stage for a more rational and informed approach to water policy and management 
in the state. 
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California Water Myths2
www.ppic.org
This report seeks to rebuild public policy discussions on myth-free foundations. Improv-
ing the collection, analysis, synthesis, and use of accurate information about the state’s water 
system is also necessary to encouraging fact-based policies. 
Of course, information alone will not dispel California’s water myths. But better infor-
mation can fashion more effective responses to California’s many ongoing and future water 
challenges. In the months and years ahead, policymakers and voters will be involved in 
crucial decisions regarding one of California’s most precious and controversial resources. 
Let’s be sure those decisions are based on reality, not myth.
 Please visit the report’s publication page 
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=890
to find related resources.
myth reality
1. California is running out of water. California has run out of abundant water and will 
need to adapt to increasing water scarcity.
2. [Insert villain here] is responsible for California’s  
    water problems.
There is no true villain in California water policy, but 
opportunities exist for all sectors to better use and 
manage water. 
3. We can build our way out of California’s water   
    problems.
New infrastructure can contribute to California’s water 
supply solutions, but it is not a cure-all. 
4. We can conserve our way out of California’s water  
    problems.
Water conservation is important, but its effectiveness 
is often overstated.
5. Healthy aquatic ecosystems conflict with a healthy  
    economy.
Healthy ecosystems provide significant value to the 
California economy, and many opportunities exist for 
mutually beneficial water management.
6. More water will lead to healthy fish populations. Fish need more than water to thrive.
7. California’s water rights laws impede reform and  
    sustainable management.
The legal tools for reform are already present in 
California’s water rights laws; we just need to start 
using them. 
8. We can find a consensus that will keep all parties  
    happy.
Tough tradeoffs mean that consensus is not 
achievable on all water issues; higher levels of 
government will need to assert leadership.
In combating these myths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational and 
informed approach to water policy and management in the state.  
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Introduction
California is once again in the throes of intense debates 
about how to manage one of its most important natural 
resources, water. Several years of dry weather have  
depleted reservoirs and groundwater basins. New environ-
mental restrictions on shipping water through the fragile  
Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta have intensified water 
supply concerns in cities and farming regions that rely on 
these shipments, and proposals to bypass the Delta with 
a peripheral canal have many worried about the conse-
quences of enacting them. 
These may be the most visible and vocal issues of the 
moment, but a virtual tour around the state reveals sig-
nificant water management concerns at every turn. To the 
west, cities and farms in the Russian River watershed have 
been ordered to reduce their water use to help restore flows 
for steelhead trout. To the south, some Imperial Valley resi-
dents are still smarting over requirements to fallow some 
irrigated acreage as part of a long-term transfer of Colo-
rado River water to San Diego. To the east, the success of a 
hard-won deal to restore salmon on the San Joaquin River 
depends on continued cooperation among fractious stake-
holder groups and improvements in conditions further 
downstream. To the north, water allocations for salmon 
are a recurring source of conflict on the Klamath River. 
Some summary statistics highlight why the environ-
mental conditions of California’s water resources have 
become a major management concern in recent decades. 
Twenty-two percent of the state’s 122 remaining native 
fish species are already listed as threatened or endangered 
under the state and federal Endangered Species Acts, and 
another 45 percent are imperiled or qualified for listing.1 
More than 90 percent of California’s lakes, rivers, and 
streams are listed as “impaired,” meaning that they cannot 
be used for one or more of their intended uses—e.g., drink-
ing, irrigation, fishing, swimming (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2004). 
The challenges and conflicts of water management are 
likely to intensify as population growth and climate change 
increase pressure on California’s resources. The state is 
projected to gain roughly half a million residents a year 
over the coming decades (Department of Finance, 2007), 
and warming temperatures and accelerating sea level rise 
will make it increasingly difficult to satisfy agricultural, 
urban, and environmental water demands and to ensure 
adequate protection from floods (Cayan et al., 2009).
Policy decisions will be most effective in addressing 
water management goals if they are based on an accurate 
understanding of the state’s water problems and potential 
solutions. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of systematic 
technical knowledge and coordinated research capability  
to support and advance policy discussions and decisions. 
This information deficit stems in part from the highly 
decentralized nature of water management. More than a 
thousand local and regional water agencies are responsible 
for water delivery, wastewater treatment, and flood control, 
alongside many state and federal agencies. Decentralized 
management has facilitated considerable innovation and 
responsiveness to local problems, but it has also fragmented 
much of the detailed knowledge and strategic perspectives  
on California’s vast water system. And the state, with few 
resources and many competing pressures, requires little 
reporting of information from the field and devotes few 
resources to technical decision support and synthesis, 
monitoring of water use, or enforcement of water rights. 
As a result, misperceptions—or myths—about Cali-
fornia’s water problems and solutions abound among the 
public, policymakers, and even many water professionals. 
These myths—which often support particular stakeholder 
Policy decisions will be most effective in 
addressing water management goals if they 
are based on an accurate understanding of the 
state’s water problems and potential solutions.  
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interests—make public policy discussions, legislative 
debates, and water management decisions less productive 
and useful than they need to be if California’s water system 
is to respond effectively to mounting challenges. 
This report explores eight prominent myths about 
California water supply, ecosystem management, and legal 
and policy processes for water governance. (See the text 
box below for links to some additional myths.) We bring 
together perspectives from ecology, economics, engineer-
ing, law, and the physical sciences to examine the origins of 
these myths, how they influence policy, and where they fall 
short in their assessment of water problems and solutions. 
For each myth, we then suggest a replacement that would 
better guide policy. A concluding section summarizes key 
elements of a myth-free policy platform for California 
and highlights actions to strengthen the information and 
analysis needed for sound policy decisions.
 
Myth 1: California Is Running Out 
of Water
The Myth 
The popular press often propagates the myth that Califor-
nia is running out of water. As a recent example: “Have 
you seen Lake Oroville lately? If so, you know California is 
running out of water” (Speer, 2008). This myth stems from 
rigid notions that there is no flexibility in water manage-
ment and that the economy will grind to a halt if shortages 
occur. It persists despite ample historical evidence and 
numerous economic and technical studies showing that 
Californians can adapt successfully (albeit at some cost and 
inconvenience) to living in an arid region with variable  
and changing water conditions. By implying that Califor-
nians cannot adapt, the “running out of water” myth dis-
courages efforts to manage water resources more efficiently. 
How the Myth Drives Debate
The notion that California is running out of water is effec-
tive in raising alarm about serious water problems but 
encourages a simplistic and sometimes counterproductive 
attitude toward solving them. If we are “running out of 
water,” we have to “get more.” The assumption underlying 
this myth is that California’s water use and management 
are more or less fixed. So new water demands from popu-
lation growth can be addressed only by developing addi-
tional supplies, whatever the cost. This view assumes that 
California’s water users have little ability to stretch existing 
supplies through improvements in operations, gains in 
water use efficiency, or reallocation across sectors.
The Reality
There is a kernel of truth in this myth: California’s avail-
able water supplies are limited. Most of California’s river 
flows have already been allocated (sometimes several times 
over), and groundwater resources have been overdrawn 
in many places.2 Water users often experience shortages 
relative to these allocations and to past use, as a result of 
drought and environmental protection measures. With 
Additional water myths 
A related article (Hanak et al., 2009), available at http://www
.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=918, expands on this report 
and discusses several additional water myths and realities:
Myth: Water markets can solve California’s water problems.  
Reality: Water markets work best in a coordinated portfolio of 
water management activities.
Myth: Restoring native ecosystems is essential for native 
species recovery.  
Reality: We must find ways to restore native species within 
altered ecosystems.
Myth: Current flood protection standards keep communities 
safe.  
Reality: Current standards increase flood risk in many locations.
Myth: Groundwater is separate from surface water. 
Reality: Despite some legal distinctions, California’s ground-
water and surface water are often closely interconnected and 
sometimes managed jointly.
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climate change, shortages could increase, as warming 
temperatures reduce water supplies currently stored in the 
Sierra Nevada snowpack (Cayan et al., 2009).
But it is not true that California is “running out of 
water.” Given California’s Mediterranean-type climate, 
with variable rainfall and a dry growing season, water has 
always been scarce, and adaptation has always been an 
important feature of water use (Hundley, 2001).
In recent decades, increasing water use efficiency has 
helped California adapt to population growth and higher 
allocations of water for the environment. Agriculture and 
related activities account for a large but declining share 
of non-environmental water use—77 percent in 2005, 
down from 90 percent in 1960 (Figure 1). A driving force 
in improving the economic efficiency of irrigation is the 
steady increase in crop yields per acre. Over the last four 
decades, California’s crop yields have increased at an 
average rate of 1.42 percent per year (Brunke, Howitt, and 
Sumner, 2005). As farmers have shifted to higher value 
horticultural and orchard crops, they have adopted more 
efficient irrigation technologies.3 These yield increases and 
shifts to higher value crops have greatly increased the real 
dollar value per acre-foot of irrigation water.4 
Urban dwellers also have been adapting. Following 
several decades of increases in per capita use spurred by 
rising incomes and increased home and lot sizes, many 
urban water agencies began implementing conservation 
programs during the early 1990s drought. The result has 
been per capita declines in both coastal and inland regions 
of California (see Figure 2, which shows inland California’s 
water use with and without the low-desert Colorado River 
region, where per capita use is particularly high). Further 
use reductions are being spurred by the recent drought and 
new environmental restrictions on pumping water to users 
south and west of the Delta.
Water managers also have improved the management 
of developed water supplies, which has enhanced water 
supply reliability and flexibility. Tools include banking 
excess surface water from wet years in groundwater basins 
for use in dry years (“conjunctive use”), treating waste-
water and stormwater for reuse, and the marketing and 
trading of water, all of which have expanded greatly since 
the 1990s.5 
Various studies suggest considerable scope for future 
adaptations to scarcity, including further gains in water use 
efficiency, changing operating schedules for water stored 
and released from reservoirs (reservoir “reoperation”), 
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Figure 2. Per capita urban water use is now declining 
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improvements in conjunctive use and recycling, and some 
additional reallocation across sectors through water mar-
keting (Department of Water Resources, 2009a; Jenkins 
et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2006; Zilberman et al., 1993).6 
Although climate change may significantly reduce water 
availability and growth in farm revenues, California agri-
culture appears able to adapt without declines in revenues 
from today’s levels, thanks to projected improvements in 
irrigation and crop production technology and growth in 
demand for higher value crops.7 
In short, California will run out of water only if its 
water sector does not muster the incentives, technology, 
and political capacity to adapt to changing demands and 
preferences for water use—as it has in the past. 
Replacing the Myth 
California is not running out of water, but the state will 
face increasing water scarcity. It is often said that there is 
not a shortage of water, only a shortage of cheap water.
Institutions and technologies must continue to change 
to meet future demand. Public education can help Cali-
fornians realize that they reside in an arid region. With 
continued attention and adaptation, California will have 
sufficient water resources to sustain prosperous social and 
economic development into the indefinite future.
Myth 2: [Insert Villain Here] Is 
Responsible for California’s Water 
Problems
The Myth
California’s water system would work well if it were not for       
                    [fill in the blank].
One of the most common myths about California 
water is that some villain or other is preventing the state 
from meeting its water demands and that eliminating 
or reforming that villain would solve California’s water 
problems. Call it the “Chinatown Myth,” in honor of that 
movie’s villain, Noah Cross, who created artificial water 
shortages by stealing water from right under people’s 
noses. A good villain is always rhetorically useful and 
makes problems seem easier to solve.
Everyone in California has a favorite real-world water 
villain. Common favorites are: (1) wasteful Southern 
California homeowners, (2) farmers who receive federally 
subsidized water, and (3) the state and federal Endangered 
Species Acts. The danger with this myth is that it can lead 
to inaction. Everyone points a finger at someone else, rather 
than recognizing that we all need to change our water ways. 
Villain 1: Wasteful Homeowners in Southern California
The favorite villains of many Northern Californians are 
the profligate homeowners of Southern California who use 
water to grow luscious lawns, fill and refill their swimming 
pools, and remove leaves from their driveways. According 
to this myth, water misuse is common in the Southland, 
where people forget that they are living in a former desert 
and import vast amounts of water, including water from 
Northern California.
How the Myth Drives Debate
If Southern California homeowners are the problem, state 
policy should focus on limiting their water use. Imported 
water is almost always diverted from alternative environ-
mental or local water uses, and there is no reason to incur 
those costs if the water is not truly needed. 
The Reality
The myth of Southern Californians as water villains is 
based on misperceptions of actual water use practices across 
the state. 
Average water use per person in the South Coast—where 
the majority of Southern Californians live—is, in fact, among 
It is often said that there is not a shortage of 
water, only a shortage of cheap water.
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the lowest in California (Figure 3). This stems partly from 
a cooler climate and denser land use than in inland areas. 
Statewide, outdoor water use averages over 40 percent of 
residential water use and increases with hotter climates, 
larger lot sizes, and a greater proportion of single-family 
homes. The Southern California coast has the highest 
percentage of multifamily homes in the state, and its home 
lots tend to be smaller (Hanak and Davis, 2006). 
Moreover, South Coast water agencies have been among 
the most aggressive in reducing per capita water use. An 
effective way to reduce water use is to charge higher rates—
known as “increasing block rates”—for greater quantities 
consumed. In 2003, almost two-thirds of the population of 
California’s South Coast paid increasing block rates. Only 
half of all Californians paid such rates, including a mere  
13 percent of San Joaquin Valley residents (Hanak, 2005). 
South Coast water utilities also provide significant 
incentives for conservation. For instance, the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California has spent more than 
$185 million over the last decade encouraging adoption of 
water efficient appliances, drought resistant landscaping, 
and other conservation practices. Shifts out of manufactur-
ing in the early 1990s also reduced per capita urban use. 
Overall, the South Coast used nearly 450,000 acre-feet 
less water in 2005 than a decade earlier, despite having 
2.4 million additional residents.8 The region also leads in 
reclaimed water use.
It might be tempting to simply change the villain in 
California water policy from pool-loving residents of the 
South Coast to urban and suburban residents of Sacra-
mento, the San Joaquin Valley, and other inland areas. 
But the urban sector as a whole accounts for just over 20 
percent of water use in California, and utilities in virtually 
every region are working to reduce per capita use.9 Making 
one region into a villain oversimplifies the complex water 
demands in California and suggests that water conserva-
tion is a bigger issue in one region or one sector than in the 
state as a whole. 
Villain 2: Subsidized Agriculture
The chief villains for many urban water users and envi-
ronmental advocates are the recipients of federally sub-
sidized irrigation water. The largest federal reclamation 
project in the United States is the Central Valley Project 
(CVP), which supplies water to thousands of Central Valley 
farms—as well as to some urban water users (Sax et al., 
2006). The estimated yearly subsidy to farmers receiving 
CVP water, relative to the full-cost rate, is roughly $60 mil-
lion (Environmental Working Group, 2004).
In the minds of California’s urban water users and 
environmental reformers, subsidized rates paid by farmers 
in the CVP are unjustified and unfair. Critics claim that 
these subsidies have undermined irrigators’ incentive to 
conserve and encouraged them to grow lower value crops 
such as wheat, grain, cotton, and rice, which critics believe 
should be grown elsewhere.10
How the Myth Drives Debate
If federal reclamation subsidies are unfair and undermine 
agricultural conservation, the most obvious solution is to 
eliminate them. And Congress did increase CVP prices to 
farmers under both the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 
(96 Stat. 1261) and the Central Valley Project Improvement 
Act (CVPIA) of 1992 (106 Stat. 4600, 4706). As a result of 
these laws, prices for federal agricultural water are likely to 
SOURCE: Department of Water Resources (provisional data). 
NOTES: The figure shows 2005 applied water use (for a definition, see Myth 4). The high per capita use in
the Colorado River region is partly from golf-based tourism.
Figure 3. South Coast urban water use is among the lowest
in the state
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increase by more than 65 percent from 2000 to 2030. But  
in the meantime, CVP farmers continue to receive a sig-
nificant subsidy. Many argue that it would be fairer and 
more efficient to speed up this process by eliminating the 
subsidy entirely.
The Reality
The view of subsidized farmers as water villains is based 
on misunderstandings of the role these subsidies play in 
today’s farm economy.
First, the claims of unfairness are unjustified, because 
most of today’s farmers have already paid for the subsidy 
through higher land prices; land eligible for subsidized 
water is more expensive (Huffaker and Gardner, 1986).11 
Although the windfall for original landowners might have 
been unfair, current owners are receiving what the U.S. 
government led them to expect they would receive when 
they purchased this land.12
Second, eliminating water subsidies is not the only way 
to encourage farmers to conserve water. As noted above, 
the economic efficiency of agricultural water use in Cali-
fornia has increased steadily. Since the early 1990s, water 
scarcity has driven efficiency improvements among CVP 
farmers south of the Delta, as they seek to adjust to short-
ages from drought and regulatory changes.13 Water mar-
kets also are encouraging more efficient use. Farmers who 
can earn more by selling water than using it themselves 
have an incentive to do so, even if they pay little for the 
water.14 Since the early 1990s, active farm-to-farm markets 
have moved water to water-short areas with higher value 
output (Hanak, 2003).
In sum, continued scarcity, along with higher water 
prices and other market forces, is likely to further encour-
age both conservation and conversion of land to less  
water intensive crops and an overall decline in agricul-
tural water use (Department of Water Resources, 2005). 
Villain 3: The Endangered Species Acts
To many water users and commentators, the true villains 
are the federal and state Endangered Species Acts (ESA) 
(Wall Street Journal, 2009). In this view, environmentalists 
use these laws to force unreasonable reductions in agricul-
ture and urban water deliveries to protect a few species of 
worthless bait fish. As some critics have put it, the problem 
plaguing California’s water system is not a natural drought 
but a “regulatory drought” from environmental flow 
restrictions. Since 2008, this myth seems to have gained 
validity, as water exports have been reduced following a 
federal judge’s ruling that state and federal water managers 
were not adequately considering the needs of fish species in 
the Delta.15 
How the Myth Drives Debate
This myth has led some water users to call for reducing 
legal protections for native species. The federal Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 is one of the world’s strongest environ-
mental laws. Congress concluded that species are of ines-
timable value and prohibited the “taking” of endangered 
species, regardless of the costs. Only the Endangered Spe-
cies Committee, a federal cabinet-level group sometimes 
referred to as the “God Squad,” can grant an exemption to 
the act’s proscriptions—an action taken only twice to date. 
Some California water users now demand either that the 
committee be convened to allow more water to be exported 
from the Delta or that Congress amend the act.
The Reality
It is true that recent Endangered Species Act restrictions 
have reduced water supplies available for some water users.
However, the effects are often overstated. Recent delta 
smelt restrictions follow a time of high sustained water 
exports and coincide with an ongoing drought—in all, 
these restrictions account for 15–20 percent of the recent 
declines in exports (Figure 4). Over the longer term, delta 
smelt restrictions are likely to reduce Delta exports by  
20 to 30 percent on average (Department of Water Resources, 
2008a, 2009b; Carlton, 2009) unless the smelt respond to 
large scale habitat improvements. 
Moreover, many other federal and state laws designed to 
protect public health and the environment also restrict water 
withdrawals from California’s rivers and streams.16 High 
withdrawals threaten not only fish species but also various 
9California Water Myths
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water quality and recreational uses. Simply removing the 
Endangered Species Act restrictions on water diversions 
would be unlikely to provide much additional water for non-
environmental uses, especially in the long run.
The Endangered Species Acts and other environmen-
tal laws reflect public concern over the serious effects of 
human actions on the natural environment and the costs 
of those actions to all California residents. 
Replacing the Myth
There are no true villains in California water policy. 
Responsibility for water problems must be shared by all 
water users; the problems fundamentally result from 
having a vibrant economy and society in an arid climate. 
Although rhetorically convenient, attempts to vilify one 
group of water users for California’s diverse water prob-
lems are factually incorrect and get in the way of more 
productive policy discussions.
Despite inevitable water scarcity, both urban and agri-
cultural water users throughout the state have considerable 
opportunities to use and manage water more efficiently 
(see Myth 1). It is also possible to manage water for the 
environment more effectively by taking habitat and the 
quality and timing of flows into account (Myth 6).
Myth 3: We Can Build Our Way 
Out of California’s Water Problems
The Myth
We would solve California’s water problems if we only built 
more                     [fill in the blank].
All too often, California’s water management challenges 
are attributed to a lack of infrastructure, be it (1) new surface 
storage, (2) a peripheral canal to convey water around the 
Delta, or (3) desalination plants. The myth that we can build 
our way out of water scarcity tends to appeal to politicians 
and the general public because of its simplicity; it is often 
promoted by special interest groups that stand to gain from 
a particular investment, especially if someone else will pay 
for it. The danger of focusing on technological silver bullets 
is that it deflects attention from potentially more effective 
and less costly alternatives (such as water markets, under-
ground storage, and conservation), from the benefits of 
coordinating many water management options, and from 
actions required to improve environmental conditions.
Solution 1: New Surface Storage
Calls for new surface storage frequently accompany the 
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Figure 4. Environmental restrictions account for 15–20 percent of recent Delta cutbacks 
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“running out of water” myth (Myth 1). Advocates often 
note that California’s population has nearly doubled since 
the state built the last major on-stream reservoir in the 
early 1980s and argue that new surface storage is needed 
to supply this growth and replace losses of Sierra Nevada 
snowpack storage predicted with global warming.
How the Myth Drives Debate
This myth assumes that water supply is linked directly to 
surface water storage capacity. Proponents often advocate 
large public subsidies for this additional storage and insist 
on delaying other policy changes until substantial funds 
are committed for surface storage expansion. 
The Reality
Surface storage does afford California’s water system great 
flexibility, making it possible to carry water over to the 
dry season and to smooth out year-to-year variations in 
precipitation. Surface storage operations can be especially 
effective in coordination with other water management 
actions, such as groundwater storage, water conservation, 
and water markets. Reoperation of existing surface water 
storage will play an essential role in improving California’s 
water system and adapting it to changes in climate and 
water demands (Medellin-Azuara et al., 2008; Carpenter 
and Georgakakos, 2001; Fissekis, 2008). 
However, the idea that surface storage is a silver bullet 
for the state’s water problems is a myth founded on the 
erroneous notion that large, unregulated amounts of water 
are available to fill new storage at a reasonable cost. It per-
sists because most people do not recognize the technical 
limitations and because a few local interests stand to gain 
from state subsidies for new facilities.
Because large reservoirs already exist on most major 
streams in California, expanding storage capacity has 
less potential to increase water deliveries than it did in 
the past. The two frontrunners under consideration, Sites 
Reservoir in Colusa County and Temperance Flat on the 
Upper San Joaquin River, would add 3.1 million acre-feet 
to the roughly 41 million acre-feet of existing surface 
water storage capacity and increase agricultural and urban  
water supplies by just 1 percent, at an estimated cost of  
$6.4 billion (Figure 5; Department of Water Resources, 
2009a).17 Surface storage is a costly way to expand water 
supplies in part because most favorable reservoir locations 
already have large dams.18 Early cost estimates from the 
Department of Water Resources range from roughly  
$340 per acre-foot for Sites to over $1,000 per acre-foot  
for Temperance Flat (see the table).19 
Moreover, the value of surface storage as a replacement 
for the snowpack is far from certain. If California’s over-
all climate becomes drier (as predicted by some models, 
e.g., Barnett et al., 2008, Cayan et al., 2009), new surface 
storage will provide little additional water supply because 
there will be less surplus water to store (Tanaka et al., 2006; 
Connell, 2009). More active coordination between existing 
surface reservoirs and groundwater basins—with increased 
drought (multiyear) storage kept underground—could aug-
ment overall storage capabilities at lower cost, especially 
with climate change (Tanaka et al., 2006; Connell, 2009).20
Solution 2: A Peripheral Canal
The Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta has long been at the cen-
ter of environmental, water supply, and land use conflicts, 
and its prominence in public discussions has been height-
ened in recent years by concerns over fragile levees and the 
fate of native fish species. One recurring proposal is to build 
Surface storage capacity, %
Existing: 41 maf
Agricultural and urban supplies, %
Existing: 38 maf
(1980–2005 average)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Department of Water Resources and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation data 
for Temperance Flat and Sites Reservoirs.
NOTE: maf = millions of acre-feet.
Existing
Proposed
7% 1%
93% 99%
Figure 5. New surface storage will add little to existing
water supplies
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a peripheral canal to convey export water around, rather 
than through, the Delta. To many, particularly in areas that 
depend on water exports, the peripheral canal has become 
the silver bullet for addressing the Delta’s woes.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The implication is that a peripheral canal should be built 
without delay, which would allow water exports to return 
immediately to their pre-2008 levels or higher. This think-
ing has led some water users to believe that Delta convey-
ance is the only impediment to expanding water deliveries 
and has diverted attention from many additional actions 
required to improve environmental conditions in the Delta 
and California’s water system as a whole.
The Reality
If carefully designed and managed, a peripheral canal seems 
to be the best strategy for balancing environmental and 
economic goals for water management in the Delta (Lund et 
al., 2008). The current through-Delta system is unsustain-
able for the Delta’s native fishes and for human water users 
(Lund et al., 2008). By taking export water around the Delta, 
a canal makes it possible to more separately manage water 
for exports and for the environment. Flows within the 
Delta could return to a more natural, variable regime to 
benefit the Delta’s native fishes. 
A canal would also provide urban and farm water users 
with a more reliable and cleaner source of water, while 
allowing water management within the Delta to be tailored 
to the needs of fish and other desirable aquatic organisms.  
By making it possible to continue moving water from 
Northern California to regions dependent on Delta exports, 
a canal would support other water management actions, 
such as underground water storage, reservoir reoperation, 
and water markets, and would make water supplies more 
resilient in the face of climate change (Tanaka et al., 2006, 
2008; Connell, 2009).
However, a peripheral canal alone will fix neither the 
Delta nor California’s water supply issues, and it is unlikely 
to improve native fish populations enough to allow imme-
diate increases in exports above currently restricted levels. 
A favorable outcome for native fishes depends on careful 
attention to the environmental aspects of the project, as 
well as complementary investments in fish habitat (Moyle 
and Bennett, 2008). 
To succeed, the canal would need to be accompanied 
by a robust governance package that establishes legal and 
procedural safeguards against extracting too much water 
and that ties achievement of ecosystem management goals 
to water diversions. Since recent fish population declines 
occurred during a period of high water exports (see Fig-
ure 4), some reduction in water exports would likely be 
required with a canal, at least until fish populations recover 
(Isenberg et al., 2008a).21 
Solution 3: Seawater Desalination
To the general public, seawater desalination often seems 
like the ultimate technological fix for California’s water 
supply. With more than 2,000 miles of ocean and bay 
coastline, a large coastal population, and a cutting edge 
technology sector, California appears well positioned to 
harness desalination. Some expect this new technology to 
become so inexpensive that it will soon banish most water 
shortages and controversies.
annual cost per 
acre-foot ($)
method Low High
Conjunctive use and groundwater storage 10 600
Water transfers 50 550
Agricultural water use efficiency (net) 145 240
Urban water use efficiency (gross) 230 635
Recycled municipal water 300 1,300
Surface storage (state projects) 340 1,070
Desalination, brackish 500 900
Desalination, seawater 900 2,500
SourceS: Department of Water resources (2009a); Department of Water resources (2007)—low 
estimate for surface storage; Department of Water resources (2005)—conjunctive use; authors’ 
estimates—water transfers.
NoteS: For conjunctive use, the costs of water for banking may be additional. For most options 
(except water use efficiency), estimates do not include delivery costs, which can be substantial.  
For a definition of gross and net water use efficiency, see Myth 4.
Surface storage is a costly source of new water supplies 
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How the Myth Drives Debate
People point to declining costs and examples in the Middle 
East and Australia, where desalination is now used, and 
wonder why California is not pursuing this solution more 
aggressively. As with surface storage, they argue for public 
subsidies to jump-start desalination investments.
The Reality
Desalination of brackish water (less than 30% as salty as 
seawater) is already a proven technology in inland South-
ern California. Seawater desalination might become useful 
in some situations: (1) in coastal urban areas isolated from 
the state’s wider supply network, such as the Central Coast 
(Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006), and (2) as a reliable par-
tial supply for urban areas dependent on imported water. 
Reliability is the primary motivation for planned desalina-
tion facilities in San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as 
preliminary investigations in the San Francisco Bay Area.
However, seawater desalination is unlikely to become 
a major California water source for several reasons. The 
technology poses some major environmental challenges, 
including trapping marine life at intakes, disposal of brine 
by-product, and high energy use. It is also expensive: 
recent reviews find widely variable desalination costs, with 
desalination of brackish water costing about $400 to $600 
per acre-foot and seawater desalination costing about $600 
to $1,000 per acre-foot for large units without unusual 
brine disposal costs (Karagiannis and Soldatos, 2008; 
Texas Water Development Board, n.d.). For California, 
current cost estimates are somewhat higher, likely reflect-
ing the greater costs of brine disposal and environmental 
mitigation for seawater plant location (see the table).22 Even 
with continued technological advances, seawater desalina-
tion is likely to remain relatively costly for urban uses and 
unlikely to become viable for directly supplying irrigation 
water for agriculture.
Replacing the Myth
Although new infrastructure can contribute to California’s 
water supply solutions, it is not a panacea in terms of costs 
or environmental benefits. 
Billions of dollars of infrastructure investments are 
urgently needed but mostly for maintaining or rehabilitat-
ing aging facilities (Hanak and Barbour, 2005), refurbishing 
major storage and conveyance systems to reduce their envi-
ronmental impacts (temperature controls on dam outlets and 
more fish-friendly diversions), and improving connections 
within the water system to improve flexibility in operations. 
Infrastructure investments are usually best financed by local 
beneficiaries and best employed within a portfolio approach 
to water management, which orchestrates a wide range of 
actions and includes new infrastructure along with water 
markets, underground storage, reuse, and conservation. 
Myth 4: We Can Conserve Our 
Way Out of California’s Water 
Problems
The Myth
The water conservation myth implies that California can 
adapt to changing conditions by focusing primarily on 
water use efficiency. Examples of countries such as Aus-
tralia, where daily residential water use is reported to have 
fallen to roughly 40 gpcd during the recent drought (versus 
CALiFoRniA DEPARTMEnT oF WATER RESouRCES
California already has substantial surface reservoir capacity, including 
Lake Oroville.
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about 145 gpcd in California), are used to highlight the 
scope for savings (Whyte, 2009).23 The danger with this 
myth lies in overestimating the real water savings achiev-
able through conservation. Adherence to this myth dis-
tracts discussion from the need for more sweeping changes 
in water institutions, infrastructure, and management.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The idea that improvements in urban and agricultural 
water use efficiency could free up enough water for popula-
tion growth and increased environmental use is appealing. 
It places blame for water problems on water users (Myth 2) 
while providing a silver bullet solution. 
Environmentalists often promote conservation as an 
alternative to new infrastructure. After more than a decade 
of financial support to urban water utilities implementing 
conservations measures, a new law now requires reduc-
tions in per capita urban water use by 20 percent, in the 
expectation that this will free up significant supplies for 
other purposes.24 
The Reality
Improvements in urban and agricultural water use effi-
ciency have already helped California adapt to scarcity,  
and continued reductions in water use can help Califor-
nia cope with droughts and shortages (Myth 1). Reducing 
water withdrawals from streams and groundwater basins 
can yield environmental benefits, including improved 
streamflow, reduced pollution runoff into rivers, streams, 
and beaches (Noble et al., 2003), and reduced energy use 
for acquiring and treating water (California Energy Com-
mission, 2005).25 
But public policy discussions about water conserva-
tion often overestimate potential water savings by failing to 
distinguish between net and gross water use. Net (or “con-
sumptive”) water use refers to water consumed by people 
or plants, embodied in manufactured goods, evaporated, 
or discharged to saline waters. Once this water is used, it 
cannot be recaptured. Gross (or “applied”) water use refers 
to water that runs through the taps of a home or business,  
or is applied to fields—not all of which is consumed. Some 
of it—known as “return flow”—is available for reuse, 
because it returns to streams and irrigation canals or 
recharges groundwater basins. Conservation measures 
often target reductions in gross water use. But because of 
return flow, net water savings are often lower (and never 
higher) than gross water savings. Only net water savings 
provide more water.
In agriculture, achieving significant net water savings 
generally requires switching to crops that consume less 
water or reducing irrigated land area; these two measures 
typically reduce farm profits and are therefore costly.26 
By contrast, irrigation efficiency investments, which can 
increase farm profits, may reduce gross water use per acre 
but increase net water use on farms by making it easier for 
farmers to stretch their gross supplies across additional 
acres of cropland.27 
Similar issues arise for urban water conservation. 
Outdoors, switching from thirsty lawns to plantings that 
use less water (a crop switch) can greatly reduce net water 
use. But reducing landscape overwatering (a reduction in 
gross water use) will generate net savings only if the excess 
water has not previously been recaptured in a stream or a 
groundwater basin. 
Opportunities for net savings from indoor water con-
servation depend on location. Almost all indoor water use 
returns to the system as treated wastewater. Thus, indoor 
conservation in coastal areas, which discharge wastewater  
to the sea, produces substantial net water savings. But 
indoor conservation in Sacramento—where wastewater 
discharges to the Sacramento River and can be reused by 
others before reaching the ocean—has little effect on Cali-
fornia’s net water use.
Not distinguishing between net and gross water sav-
ings in public discussions can create unrealistically high 
expectations for water conservation and inaccurate evalua-
tions of the benefits of specific conservation measures. For 
Only net water savings provide more water.
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instance, the large potential savings from urban conserva-
tion reported in the 2005 California Water Plan Update are 
gross, not net, savings (Department of Water Resources, 
2005). The same is true for the governor’s plan to reduce 
gross per capita urban water use 20 percent by 2020 (State 
Water Resources Control Board, 2009); although useful, 
the plan would produce significantly less than a 20 percent 
reduction in net urban water use.
Public discussions also frequently fail to acknowledge 
that water conservation has implementation and operating 
costs, just like other actions (see the table). Some conserva-
tion quickly pays for itself—for example, low-flow fixtures 
that reduce hot water use save both energy and applied 
water (Gleick et al., 2003). But other actions can be quite 
costly, such as replacing lawns with landscapes that use less 
water (Hanak and Davis, 2006).
Replacing the Myth
Water conservation is important, but its effectiveness is 
often overstated. 
To free up supplies for other users, conservation must 
focus on net water reductions. As with building new 
infrastructure, conservation should be part of a portfolio 
approach to water management, which is much more likely 
to be successful in addressing California’s complex, locally 
varied, and evolving water problems (Jenkins et al., 2004). 
Myth 5: Healthy Aquatic 
Ecosystems Conflict with  
a Healthy Economy
The Myth
Underlying this classic “fish versus people” argument is the 
belief that natural resources should be used to generate eco-
nomic wealth, and that any resource not so used is somehow 
“wasted.” In this view, environmental water uses and healthy 
watersheds have little or no economic value, so allocating water 
to the environment or imposing water quality regulations 
involves much greater economic losses than potential benefits. 
Although rhetorically convenient for individuals and 
regions suffering from water scarcity or facing the costs of 
implementing water quality regulations, this myth over-
looks or undervalues the real economic benefits of healthy 
ecosystems. The dangers are underinvesting in environ-
mental actions and failing to pursue water management 
strategies that serve both the natural environment and 
overall economic well-being. 
How the Myth Drives Debate
The myth of an inevitable conflict between economic and 
environmental water uses drives much of the recent debate 
over water allocation, particularly during times of scarcity (see 
Myth 2). It also fuels resistance to the regulation of polluted 
runoff caused by urban activities and farming operations.
The Reality
Environmental regulations often do interfere with tra-
ditional economic activities. For instance, the recently 
imposed environmental restrictions on Delta water exports 
cost several thousand farm jobs (Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, 
and MacEwan, 2009b), and uncertainties about Delta 
supplies are raising concerns in some Southern California 
cities about the ability to approve new development.28 
BigSToCkPhoTo
Replacing lawns with landscapes that use less water generates net water 
savings but can be quite costly.
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Yet environmental water uses also add economic value 
to California. This is not always readily apparent, because 
the market generally does not put a price on environmental 
flows, healthy watersheds, or the services that they provide 
(National Research Council, 2005a; Brauman et al., 2007). 
But new tools are emerging to measure and economically 
value these services (see the text box at right). For example, 
instream flows support recreational and commercial fish- 
eries, enable water-based recreation, and increase water 
quality (Daily et al., 2009). Wetlands and healthy water-
sheds also reduce flood risks. Watershed protections save 
U.S. cities billions of dollars per year in avoided treatment 
costs (Postel and Thompson, 2005); San Francisco alone 
saves tens of millions of dollars per year because it receives 
water from the pristine Hetch Hetchy watershed (Null 
and Lund, 2006).29 Sacramento Valley rice farming has 
developed substantial mutual benefits with wildfowl (Bird, 
Pettygrove, and Eadie, 2000). And most people are will-
ing to pay for the continued existence of native species and 
landscapes, even if they may never see them (sometimes 
called a “nonuse” or “existence” value). 
One consequence of the failure to put a price tag on 
environmental flows is that many environmental water 
demands remain unsatisfied.30 In addition, public and 
private decisions often neglect the economic costs of envi-
ronmental effects from traditional agricultural and urban 
water uses. For example, many groundwater basins are 
contaminated by accumulations of nutrients and pesticides 
from farming or from leaching of industrial chemicals 
(Oster, Vaux, and Wallace, 1994; California Department 
of Pesticide Regulation, 2009). Although environmental 
regulations have begun to hold water users, dischargers, 
and land use agencies responsible, others generally bear  
the costs of the environmental degradation—through 
diminished recreational opportunities, higher drinking 
water treatment costs, greater health risks, increased flood-
ing, and other effects, including health risks for wildlife 
and plants.
The recent San Joaquin River settlement, which will 
decrease agricultural diversions to benefit salmon habitat, 
provides a good illustration of the importance of consider-
Valuing ecosystem services 
Ecosystem services are benefits that ecosystems provide to 
humans. Healthy rivers and watersheds, for example, can 
provide salmon and waterfowl, whitewater for kayakers, and 
clean drinking water for cities. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) gives four ecosystem services categories: 
Provisioning services — providing food and water.
Regulating services — sequestering carbon and reducing 
soil erosion.
Cultural services — providing recreation and spiritual renewal.
Supporting services — promoting soil fertility and primary 
production.
It was historically difficult to measure and value these services, 
except for the few services (e.g., food) traded in the market-
place. Scientists today, however, are developing techniques 
to estimate how various actions will affect ecosystem services 
and to value those services in economic and non-economic 
terms (DeGroot, Wilson, and Boumans, 2002; Daily et al., 2009). 
A recent study by the Science Advisory Board for the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2009) concludes that the 
government should better integrate ecosystem services into 
decisionmaking and discusses a variety of methods for valu-
ing ecosystem services. These methods include:
Measures of public attitudes — surveys and focus groups 
that elicit public preferences for ecosystem services.
Economic methods — methods to estimate how much 
people are willing to spend to avoid losing a service.
Civil valuation methods — public referenda or initiatives that 
provide information about how much the voting population 
values particular services.
ing environmental values in water management decisions. 
The estimated gains in economic value from restored flows 
(in terms of recreation, lower treatment costs, and the 
“existence” value of restored flows) can far exceed farm 
revenue losses.31 
As California’s economy continues to shift from 
resource-dependent goods production to activities more 
dependent on environmental quality for recreation and 
other ecosystem services, it will become increasingly 
important to manage water resources for both commercial 
value and healthy ecosystems. 
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Replacing the Myth
Healthy ecosystems provide significant value to California’s 
economy, partially and sometimes fully offsetting their 
costs to traditional economic sectors. Direct benefits include 
improvements in recreation, commercial fishing, and drink-
ing and agricultural water quality, and indirect benefits 
include improvements in the quality of life in California.
California must find ways to manage water jointly for 
environmental and commercial benefits. Better accounting of 
water use and its economic and environmental benefits and 
costs can help guide policies for watershed management. 
Myth 6: More Water Will  Lead  
to Healthy Fish Populations
The Myth
Ongoing water management debates all involve a com-
mon question: “How much water do the fish need?” This 
question stems from the assumption that simply allocat-
ing more water will lead to healthy fish populations. Those 
involved in managing water resources know that this 
assumption is wrong. Yet it remains the primary (if not 
sole) focus of debate, often to the detriment of other, more 
important factors for species recovery. 
How the Myth Drives Debate
The assumption that more water is sufficient to recover fish 
species oversimplifies current policy debates. Utilities and 
water contractors focus on this myth because it implies 
that a science-based, quantifiable solution exists with 
reasonable certainty. It allows financially strapped fish-
ery agencies to continue monitoring flows using existing 
stream gauges, rather than expanding efforts to measure 
fish populations. Elected officials also rely on this myth 
because it is easy to communicate and understand. The 
result has been a discussion of environmental flows discon-
nected from other fish needs and less effective in support-
ing fish populations.
The Reality
The myth that more water is sufficient for healthy fish 
populations rests on a basic truth: To state the obvious, 
fish need water.32 Streamflow diversions and groundwater 
pumping have significantly diminished fish numbers, with 
great effects on Central Valley, Lahontan, and Central 
Coast and South Coast rivers and streams (Moyle, 2002; 
Moyle et al., 2009). Perhaps the most striking example 
is the complete dewatering of the San Joaquin River and 
the resulting extirpation of spring-run Chinook salmon 
(Brown, 2000; Moyle, 2002). Clearly, in some cases more 
water is necessary for improving fish stocks.
But more water alone is rarely sufficient. The best 
answer to the question “How much water do the fish 
need?”—one that reflects the reality of allocating water to 
the environment—is the maddeningly vague “It depends.” 
First, more water is not always better for fish. If the 
water is of the wrong quality—in terms of temperature, 
sediment, nutrients, and contaminants—it does little 
good and may do harm. Less water of better quality might 
support larger and healthier desirable fish populations.33 
Fishes adapted to cold, clear waters, such as salmonids, 
do not benefit from higher releases of warm, nutrient-rich 
water (National Research Council, 2005b). Alternatively, 
fishes that evolve in warmer waters tend to do poorly when 
water temperatures are made artificially cold by releases 
from dams (Clarkson and Childs, 2000).
Second, without sufficient physical habitat, more water 
does little good and may cause harm. Habitat needs con-
nectivity and complexity, along with the ability to adjust 
to changing conditions (Graf, 2001; Zedler, 2000). For 
example, increasing winter and spring flows on leveed or 
channelized rivers cut off from the floodplain provides 
little benefit and may even harm scarce in-channel habitat. 
California must find ways to  
manage water jointly for environmental  
and commercial benefits. 
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Third, poorly timed flows can be ineffective or counter-
productive. Water allocations for the environment should 
be viewed differently from irrigation water allocations, 
with yearly or monthly allocations at some fixed flow rate. 
California’s Mediterranean climate has large seasonal, 
annual, and spatial variations in flows, temperatures, and 
physical habitat. Few efforts to manage ecosystems, much 
less individual fish species, adequately account for this 
variability when prescribing increases in flow (Baron et al., 
2002; Moyle et al., 2009). 
Fourth, many factors can affect wild fish populations, 
such as salmon and steelhead, that migrate between rivers 
and the ocean. These factors range from ocean conditions, 
to rates and timing of pumping from the South Delta 
pumping plants, to interactions with fish of hatchery origin 
(Moyle and Bennett, 2008). Thus, putting more water down 
a river without addressing problems at other locations may 
not significantly improve fish populations.
Finally, science simply cannot accurately and precisely 
predict how much water the fish need. Large uncertainties  
are unavoidable in assessing the magnitude, timing, fre-
quency, and duration of ecological flows. To address these 
uncertainties, adaptive management strategies, which view 
all environmental flows as experimental and establish 
procedures for adjusting them, will be required (National 
Research Council, 2004). To date, no major California 
water projects have successfully implemented adaptive 
management. 
Replacing the Myth
Native aquatic species need more than water to prosper. 
To support native fish populations, water flows must have 
appropriate seasonal and interannual variability, abundant 
The best answer to the question  
“How much water do the fish need?”  
is the maddeningly vague “It depends.”
and complex physical habitat, high water quality, and pro-
tection from the effects of invasive species. 
Effective water policy must pragmatically embrace 
this complexity. Solutions will need to be flexible, account 
for the natural variability of water and the surrounding 
environment, and account for the complexity of ecosystem 
responses. Fishery agencies will need greater resources to 
adequately monitor the effects of changing flows, or they 
will risk making serious errors in flow prescriptions. Most 
challenging of all, effective solutions will require greater 
flexibility and creativity on the part of agricultural and 
urban water providers and may reduce the reliability of 
water supplies.
Myth 7: California’s Water 
Rights Laws Impede Reform and 
Sustainable Management
The Myth
This myth promotes the idea that California cannot 
effectively address its current and future water challenges 
because of its system of archaic and entrenched water 
rights. In this view, century-old water allocations and rules 
BigSToCkPhoTo
Many factors can affect wild fish populations, such as these salmon,  
as they migrate between rivers and the ocean.
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still dominate California water law. So, for example, ineffi-
cient water uses are insulated from regulation except in the 
most egregious cases of waste. Likewise, seriously degraded 
aquatic ecosystems cannot receive sufficient water because 
of longstanding water and contract rights. Belief in the 
rigidity of California water law has been a major impedi-
ment to improving water policy and management.
How the Myth Drives Debate
Many impartial observers of California’s water rights sys-
tem believe in this myth, but it is also perpetuated by those 
who stand to lose from changes in their water rights. Thus, 
many groundwater users argue that the state has no author-
ity to regulate their actions, and senior surface water rights 
holders furnish legal objections to being held accountable 
for environmental water flows. Water rights holders and 
water contractors often contend that the government must 
pay them just compensation when it restricts their water use 
to protect endangered species or water quality. The difficul-
ties of major legislative or constitutional reforms of water 
rights and the potential costs of compensation can appear 
as insurmountable obstacles to reform. 
The Reality
California’s system of water rights is a complex, often 
confusing, and sometimes incoherent amalgam.34 Chal-
lenges to water use efficiency and to existing allocations of 
water can be problematic, both because of costs and delays 
of adjudication and because water and contract rights to 
water service are “property” under the California and fed-
eral constitutions and cannot be “taken” unless the govern-
ment pays just compensation to the owners. 
However, California water law embodies far more flex-
ibility and potential for reform than is often understood. 
Far from being an absolute form of private property, water 
rights are shaped and constrained by a variety of rules 
designed to ensure that all water uses are reasonable and 
promote the public interest.
The “reasonable use” requirement of California’s Con-
stitution is the foundation of the state’s water rights system 
and applies to all water rights.35 The California Supreme 
Court has held that “no one can acquire a vested right to 
the unreasonable use of water” (Barstow v. Mojave Water 
Agency, 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 
1983). Consequently, the state may enforce the reasonable 
use mandate without running afoul of the constitutional 
ban on “taking” property.36 Water users, as well as individ-
ual members of the public, have the authority to challenge 
an existing water use as unreasonable.
Reasonable use is a dynamic principle that can respond 
to changes in hydrology, technology, scientific information, 
water demand, and economic and social conditions (Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 
1980). The determination of reasonable use “depends 
on the entire circumstances of each case” and cannot be 
resolved in isolation from critical statewide considerations. 
As water becomes increasingly scarce, a paramount con-
sideration is the “ever increasing need for the conservation 
of water” (Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 2000).
California water law embodies 
far more flexibility and potential for reform 
than is often understood.  
BigSToCkPhoTo
The public trust doctrine was used to require Los Angeles to divert less 
water from Mono Lake to protect its ecosystem.
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The public trust doctrine further contributes to the 
flexibility of California’s water rights system. The state has 
both the authority and the “affirmative duty . . . to protect 
public trust uses whenever feasible” (National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court, 1983). This means that the state 
“has the power to reconsider allocation decisions” even 
after it has awarded a water right. As with the reasonable 
use requirement, the public trust doctrine is dynamic and 
“sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs” 
(Marks v. Whitney, 1971). 
The flexibility inherent in these fundamental rules of 
California water rights law has enabled the state to address 
inefficient or outdated water uses in a variety of settings.37 
The doctrine of reasonable use may support several neces-
sary changes in California water policy, including: 
1.  Prevention of waste and improvement in water use 
efficiency. A property right in water wholly depends on 
its reasonable use. The state has the authority to declare 
a variety of water practices unreasonable, even if they 
were considered acceptable in the past.38 This would not 
constitute a “taking” for which the state would need to 
pay just compensation.
2.  Creation of incentives to enhance water allocation 
efficiency. The reasonable use mandate can be used to 
encourage the transfer of conserved water to other users 
through a water market.
3.  Compliance with environmental standards and pro-
tection of the public trust. Because no constitutionally 
protected property right exists for an unreasonable use 
of water, when the state abates or reforms water prac-
tices that unreasonably harm the environment, it may 
do so without payment of just compensation.
Replacing the Myth
The legal tools for reform are already present in California’s 
water rights laws. Indeed, they have been there for many 
decades. We just have to use them. 
The state legislature, as well as state agencies, courts, 
and private water users, have significant authority under 
current water law to meet the myriad challenges facing 
California. 
However, strong leadership will be required to over-
come resistance to change. The State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB) needs political support and an 
adequate budget to supervise and to promote the reason-
able use of water. And California needs to begin requiring 
the full range of water rights holders to disclose their water 
use. Accurate and current information about surface and 
groundwater use is essential to the task of better managing 
the state’s water resources.
Myth 8: We Can Find a Consensus 
That Will  Keep All Parties Happy
The Myth
This myth is a modern-day reaction to the idea that Cali-
fornia’s water problems will always result in “water wars”: 
hard-fought battles that result in winners and losers, most 
often decided by the courts or public referenda. Achieving 
consensus is seen as a way to balance the competing goals 
of different stakeholders. But when consensus processes 
avoid inevitable tradeoffs, they can lead to ineffective incre-
mentalism and indecision on critical water policy issues.
How the Myth Drives Debate
Consensus-based decisionmaking was popularized during 
the CALFED39 decade, from the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s, when diverse parties sought mutually compatible 
solutions for the environmental, water supply, and land 
use problems of the Delta. Although that process is widely 
considered to have failed in achieving its primary goals, 
consensus-based decisionmaking continues as the hall-
mark of stakeholder-driven planning and policy processes. 
Many stakeholders support consensus processes to be 
sure they get a seat at the bargaining table, where they can 
defend their interests. 
The Reality
Consensus is most promising where incremental changes 
to the status quo can allow all parties to improve their 
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position without sacrificing their fundamental interests 
or positions. For instance, the California Urban Water 
Conservation Council (a group of water utilities, agencies, 
and environmental organizations) has had good success in 
fostering urban water conservation actions across the state.
However, many major water policy choices facing Cali-
fornia will not result in win-win outcomes and will require 
that some groups relinquish some of their fundamental 
positions or interests. For example, a peripheral canal can 
benefit the economy and the environment but will likely 
accelerate water quality losses for some Delta farmers and 
make it less likely that the state will provide large subsi-
dies to shore up all of the Delta’s aging levees (Lund et al., 
2008). To seek consensus on such water policy matters is 
to run the risk of maintaining the status quo rather than 
making hard choices.40
Placing a consensus process within a legal, regulatory, 
or political framework and time line can motivate par-
ties to be more earnest and timely in seeking consensus 
solutions. For instance, the San Joaquin River accord was 
reached by farmers and environmentalists under the threat 
of a court-ordered solution. If consensus processes fall 
short, some tough decisions need to be brokered by higher 
level authorities, with an aim to achieve significant buy-in, 
rather than to make all parties happy.
Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not mean 
ignoring the consequences for affected parties. When the 
best overall solutions involve losses to fragile groups, side 
payments—in cash or in kind—can help soften the costs of 
adjustment. Incentive payments are likely the best option 
for Delta landowners facing eventual loss of some islands 
to flooding (Lund et al., 2007, 2008). Financial payments 
have softened the effects of structural changes in the 
economy that had severe ramifications for some industries 
(e.g., textiles and logging), and similar strategies have been 
used to address the financial effects of water transfers in 
some California farm communities (Hanak, 2003). 
Replacing the Myth
Consensus is not always feasible for achieving sustainable 
water policy outcomes. For some big decisions, tradeoffs 
are inevitable and higher level authorities need to provide 
direction and mediate conflict.
Although decentralized decisionmaking can be highly 
effective for many local and incremental water management 
decisions, matters of broader public importance, involving 
many historically confrontational interests, will require 
strong state or federal leadership to broker solutions and 
achieve significant buy-in. Finding ways to acknowledge 
and address consequences to affected parties—without 
ceding to unreasonable calls for compensation—is a central 
challenge for California’s water future. 
Moving Beyond Myth
California faces major challenges in establishing a sus-
tainable path for water resource management in the 21st 
century, as continued population growth, unmet environ-
mental demands, and climate change will pose increasing 
strains on the state’s usable water resources, raise costs, 
and heighten already substantial conflicts among various 
interest groups. Fortunately, California’s innovative water 
resource sector will help meet those challenges. Numer-
ous local and regional water supply, quality, and flood 
control agencies actively experiment with solutions and 
learn from each other to adapt to changing conditions and 
opportunities. 
Yet a significant downside of this decentralized system 
is the limited extent to which information is collected, 
shared, and analyzed on matters of statewide importance. 
This setting fosters the persistence of water myths—a 
collection of partial truths, oversimplifications, outdated 
notions, and misperceptions—which distort policy debates 
Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs 
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and impede the development of effective policies. Myth is 
often more convenient than reality, which forces society to 
confront hard choices. 
Available, up-to-date information—such as that pre-
sented here—provides a basis for rebuilding public policy 
discussions on myth-free foundations. Some foundational 
facts include the following: First, California has passed the 
point where reasonably priced “new” water is available, 
and costly new infrastructure decisions must be weighed 
against alternatives that use existing infrastructure more 
effectively, taking into account cost, reliability, and envi-
ronmental consequences. Second, there are no villains: 
Water users in both the urban and agricultural sectors 
have been making strides to improve water use efficiency 
for some time, and environmental water uses provide eco-
nomic and social benefits. Third, improving the conditions 
of our degraded aquatic ecosystems will require adaptive 
management approaches that may reduce the reliability of 
supplies. And fourth, although some management solutions 
will provide benefits to multiple parties, many solutions will 
involve contentious tradeoffs.
To advance the policy process, California must improve 
the collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of 
information to policymakers and the public. To help dispel 
the myths examined here and support a pragmatic assess-
ment of solutions, we suggest some specific actions:
• Improve the flow of existing information: Establishing 
a common understanding among the public and elected 
officials requires organizing and disseminating available 
information, such as broad trends in water use by sector 
and region and the costs of water supply alternatives 
(Myths 1, 2, 4).
• Collect and disseminate new information: To provide 
a sounder basis for using California’s water laws, e.g., 
ensuring reasonable use (Myth 7), California must col-
lect and document more accurate water use information 
from the field. This will require changes in the law, to 
To advance the policy process,  
California must improve the collection, analysis, 
synthesis, and dissemination of information  
to policymakers and the public.  
require reporting by all surface and groundwater users, 
regardless of the nature of their water rights—an unpop-
ular move for many water users.
• Expand analyses: Moving forward often will require 
significant new analysis to develop actionable informa-
tion and understanding. Expanded data collection and 
analysis will be particularly important for improving 
ecosystem management (Myth 6), integrated water 
management portfolios (Myths 3, 4), and other purposes. 
More generally, a better understanding of the value of 
ecosystem services (Myth 5) and the tradeoffs inherent 
in water policy decisions (Myth 8) can help clarify the 
policy choices California faces. 
Information alone will not dispel California’s water 
myths. In a world of scarcity and tradeoffs, myths provide 
convenient rhetoric for specific stakeholder interests. How-
ever, better technical and scientific information, analysis, and 
synthesis will be an essential support to better policy. If the 
state’s leaders are serious about finding solutions to Califor-
nia’s water challenges, they must not shy away from requiring 
better reporting and analysis, even if stakeholders resist. 
Moving beyond myth will not end debate; many dif-
ficult problems and areas of legitimate disagreement will 
remain. But when built on solid factual foundations, policy 
discussions can focus on a more realistic consideration of 
critical, long-term water management issues. The challenges 
are many, and California’s future depends on facing them. ●
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Notes
1 Moyle, Quinones, and Katz (forthcoming). Nine of the state’s 
131 native fish species have become extinct since California 
became a state.
2 Isenberg et al. (2008b) report estimates from the SWRCB that 
allocations of surface water in the Sacramento and San Joaquin 
River watersheds amount to roughly eight times the average 
streamflow and three times the highest streamflow on record.
3 Orang, Matyac, and Snyder (2008) report that surface irriga-
tion use decreased by about 30 percent from 1972 to 2001 and 
drip/microsystem use increased by about 31 percent, mostly 
from reduced field crop and increased orchard and vineyard 
planting. Most of the switch occurred from the early 1990s 
onward. Using Department of Water Resources (DWR) data on 
applied water use and irrigated acreage, we estimate that water 
applied per acre has declined from an average of 3.5 acre-feet  
per acre in the 1960s–1980s to 3.2 acre-feet per acre from  
1990 to 2005.
4 From 1972 to 1995, the real value of output per acre-foot of 
applied irrigation water increased by 19.3 percent when using 
the gross domestic product deflator to measure inflation,  
and by 92.6 percent when deflated using the U.S. Department  
of Agriculture index of prices received by farmers (Brunke, 
Howitt, and Sumner, 2005).
5 DWR (2003, 2005). For information on water banking in the 
Semitropic Water Storage District, see www.semitropic.com, and 
for the Kern Water Bank, see www.kwb.org.
6 Water management practices in other countries with similar 
climates also suggest ample scope for continued adaptation 
(Hanak et al., 2009).
7 To assess the scope for adaptation, we simulated conditions 
in 2050 using the Statewide Agricultural Production Model 
(SWAP) as presented in Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and  
MacEwan (2009a). The simulation assumes a warm-dry scenario 
of climate change (28% decline in water supply from all sources), 
a modest increase in crop productivity relative to past trends (an 
average 29% cumulative increase for all crops, following Brunke, 
Howitt, and Sumner, 2005, and Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and 
MacEwan, 2009a), and continued growth in demand for high 
value fruits and nuts. Irrigated acreage falls 20 percent statewide 
but statewide revenues from agriculture increase by 25 percent 
relative to 2005 levels. The decline in water use does lower the 
growth in revenues by about two-thirds relative to conditions 
without climate change.
8 Authors’ calculations using DWR data.
9 For a discussion of the efforts of large urban water utilities, see 
California Urban Water Agencies (2008).
10 A separate issue is whether federal crop subsidies create skewed 
incentives to grow certain crops. Some California crops benefit 
from these subsidies (notably rice, corn, about half of all cotton, 
and, indirectly, alfalfa, an input to the subsidized dairy industry). 
But most California acreage is planted to unsubsidized crops.
11 Most farmers in California pay the operating cost of bringing 
water to their farms (even if they—like other water users— 
generally do not pay the external environmental costs from 
reduced steam flows). Water delivered to farmers from the State 
Water Project, local water projects, and the Colorado River 
Project is essentially unsubsidized. In addition to its subsidized 
contractors, the CVP also delivers over 2 million acre-feet to 
“settlement” and “exchange” contractors, who received water 
before the CVP, at very low unsubsidized prices.
12 When Congress passed the original Reclamation Act of 1902 
(32 Stat. 388), the subsidies were seen as a way to make the desert 
bloom. Today, the environmental damage and undesirable 
effects of that policy are apparent, and many reclamation projects 
have benefitted large rather than yeoman farmers (Pisani, 1984; 
Arax and Wartzman, 2003). But that does not reduce the fair-
ness concerns of eliminating water subsidies on which CVP and 
other federal project farmers have long relied.
13 Since the 1992 passage of the CVPIA, CVP contractors south 
of the Delta have received reduced deliveries in most years, as 
part of a mitigation program to better support salmon runs. 
Recent regulatory actions to protect delta smelt have caused 
further reductions (see Villain 3 and Figure 4). Many CVP 
farmers now base their cropping decisions on the much higher 
price of water in the water market, rather than on the price of 
water delivered by the CVP. Since the early 1990s, farmers have 
routinely paid more than $100 per acre-foot to purchase supple-
mental water, and in the 2008 and 2009 seasons, some farmers 
on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley paid as much as $500 
per acre-foot for supplemental water (authors’ communication 
from farmers and water brokers). In contrast, contract prices for 
CVP water on the west side range from $25 to $65 per acre-foot.
14 For this reason, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act 
broadly authorizes CVP contractors to transfer water.
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15 For a discussion of the rulings, see Isenberg et al. (2008b).
16 Moyle et al. (1998); Craig (2007); Sax et al. (2006).
17 Information from CALFED Surface Storage Investigations 
as reported in DWR (2009a) and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
(2008a, 2008b). The increased percentage of agricultural and 
urban deliveries is based on the authors’ calculations (0.33 mil-
lion acre-feet per year, relative to average deliveries of 38 million 
acre-feet per year from 1980 to 2005; see Figure 1).
18 For example, the San Joaquin River basin already has roughly 
8.7 million acre-feet of storage capacity and average annual run-
off of only 6 million acre-feet.
19 The $340 per acre-foot estimate assumes very high envi-
ronmental benefits and urban water quality benefits. Without 
these benefits, the net cost per acre-foot delivered rises to $616. 
(Authors’ calculations using data from the U.S. Bureau of  
Reclamation, 2008b). Even a projected cost of $340 per acre-foot 
is likely to be too expensive for most farmers.
20 Some areas (notably Sacramento) would benefit from new 
surface storage as part of the flood management system, espe-
cially with climate warming and earlier spring runoff (Fissekis, 
2008; Zhu et al., 2007). Increased surface storage might also 
enhance fish habitat, particularly to support cold water releases 
and flows during droughts. However, the details of such envi-
ronmental enhancements have yet to be analyzed. For envi-
ronmental purposes, it would also be relevant to compare the 
reoperation of existing or expanded dams with the removal of 
some dams to allow fish to move upstream to colder water and 
spawning grounds. 
21 Even with significantly reduced exports, some form of periph-
eral canal is likely to be much cheaper for water users (and the 
state’s economy) than the status quo or ending exports. The 
analysis on which this conclusion is based allowed for export 
reductions by up to 40 percent relative to a baseline of 6 million 
acre-feet, with costs of a canal of nearly $10 billion in 2008 dol-
lars (Lund et al., 2008). If canal costs prove to be substantially 
more expensive, this would lessen the economic advantages of 
continuing Delta exports. 
22 These estimates are wide-ranging and uncertain because of dif-
ferences in cost accounting methods (low estimates often exclude 
subsidies or assume 100% capacity utilization), the evolving 
nature of the technology, and lack of experience with large-scale 
desalination in California (Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006).
23 Residential use is a component of total urban use (estimated 
at 201 gpcd in California in 2005—see Figure 2), which also 
includes commercial and industrial uses.
24 State Water Resources Control Board (2009) addresses the 
governor’s call for a 20 percent reduction by 2020. This goal is 
reflected in Senate Bill X7 7, signed into law in November 2009.
25 Streamflow improvements can be significant locally even 
without net savings from conservation measures, because return 
flows do not generally return to the same location as diversions. 
26 Agricultural areas draining to the Salton Sea are a major excep-
tion, where any use reduction generates net water savings. For 
some crops (e.g., alfalfa and wine grapes), “stress irrigation”—
which strategically waters crops less than is normal—can reduce 
consumptive use (creating net savings) by 10 to 15 percent. 
27 This issue arises because farmers pay for gross, not net, 
water use. Subsidizing irrigation efficiency improvements often 
encourages these acreage extensions. See Scheierling, Young, 
and Cardon (2006); Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008);  
Huffaker (2008); Evans and Sadler (2008); Clemmens, Allen,  
and Burt (2008); Pfeiffer and Lin (2009).
28 See Bowles and Lee (2007, 2008) for approval delays in 
Riverside County and Los Angeles Times (2008) and Steinhauer 
(2008) for a more general discussion.
29 Of course, this water quality benefit also comes with the sig-
nificant environmental cost of flooding the Hetch Hetchy valley 
in Yosemite National Park with reservoir construction in the 
early 20th century.
30 A study of environmental water uses for the 2005 State Water 
Plan found that, in 2000 and 2001 (normal and dry years, respec-
tively), the state failed to meet nine important environmental flow 
objectives by almost a million acre-feet (Environmental Defense, 
2005). And whereas urban and agricultural water use generally 
varies by no more than 10 to 20 percent between wet and dry 
years, environmental water use can drop by over 50 percent dur-
ing droughts (DWR, 2009a).
31 Annual losses in net agricultural revenues were estimated at 
$14.5 million to $38 million, depending on the extent of water 
marketing. Environmental benefits included $45 million in 
increased value of recreation, plus improved water quality for 
downstream urban and agricultural users, and nonuse value 
from the restoration of the river (Hanemann, 2005).
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32 Californians typically divert and consume much of the flow 
from the state’s major rivers, averaging 25 percent of Sacramento 
River flows and over half of flows in the San Joaquin River (cal-
culations by William Fleenor using DWR data).
33 For instance, riparian shading and temperature control 
devices on dams can provide water temperatures that support 
fish without additional water (Null, Deas, and Lund, 2009; Ver-
meyen, 1997). See also Welsh, Hodgson, and Harvey (2001).
34 These rights include riparian rights, pre-1914 appropriative 
rights, permitted and licensed water rights, prescriptive rights, 
pueblo rights, overlying and appropriative groundwater rights, 
and contract rights (Littleworth and Garner, 2007).
35 The requirement appears in Article X, Section 2, of the 
Constitution and extends to groundwater and pre-1914 surface 
water rights that otherwise fall outside the SWRCB’s permit 
and license jurisdiction (Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 2000; 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). 
36 Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District (1967).
37 To date, the SWRCB and the courts have applied Article X, 
Section 2, to declare unreasonable excessive use of water by 
riparians in light of new, competing appropriations for muni-
cipal water supply; wasteful conveyance losses to supply senior 
appropriative rights; simultaneous, aggregate diversions by 
riparians and appropriators that created critical shortages of 
water needed to protect wine grapes; maintenance of unex-
ercised riparian rights at full priority in an overappropriated 
watershed; inefficient conveyance and production of excessive 
runoff by pre-1914 appropriators, which caused flooding of 
adjacent lands; an upstream point of diversion that threatened 
recreational and other instream uses downriver; the storage and  
diversion of water that jeopardize compliance with water qual-
ity standards, the public trust, and other in situ beneficial uses; 
and excessive use of groundwater by overlying landowners in  
an overdrafted basin (Gray, 1994, 2002).
38 These may include excessive evaporative and conveyance 
losses, inefficient irrigation techniques, failure to adopt or to 
implement best management practices, and perhaps other  
profligate uses such as the irrigation of water-intensive crops  
and landscaping, failure to install low-flow water appliances,  
and continued reliance on imported water instead of using  
cost-effective alternatives such as demand reduction, use of 
recharged groundwater, and recycling of reclaimed wastewater.
39 CALFED was a program to address the various problems 
facing the Delta, bringing together the various state and federal 
agencies overseeing water supply, water quality, and species 
management. Although stakeholders from various interest 
groups were not formally represented in the CALFED governing 
structure, their participation was an essential part of negotia-
tions leading up to the development of a Record of Decision (and 
an investment plan) in 2000.
40 For a discussion of the problems with CALFED, see Little 
Hoover Commission (2005) and Hanemann and Dyckman (2009). 
See Hanak et al. (2009) for broader research on this problem.
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